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Summary. The paper investigates potential bias in awards of player disciplinary sanctions, in
the form of cautions (yellow cards) and dismissals (red cards) by referees in the English Premier
League and the German Bundesliga. Previous studies of behaviour of soccer referees have not
adequately incorporated within-game information.Descriptive statistics from our samples clearly
show that home teams receive fewer yellow and red cards than away teams. These differences
may be wrongly interpreted as evidence of bias where the modeller has failed to include within-
game events such as goals scored and recent cards issued.What appears as referee favouritism
may actually be excessive and illegal aggressive behaviour by players in teams that are behind
in score. We deal with these issues by using a minute-by-minute bivariate probit analysis of
yellow and red cards issued in games over six seasons in the two leagues. The significance of
a variable to denote the difference in score at the time of sanction suggests that foul play that
is induced by a losing position is an important influence on the award of yellow and red cards.
Controlling for various pre-game and within-game variables, we find evidence that is indicative of
home team favouritism induced by crowd pressure: in Germany home teams with running tracks
in their stadia attract more yellow and red cards than teams playing in stadia with less distance
between the crowd and the pitch. Separating the competing teams in matches by favourite and
underdog status, as perceived by the betting market, yields further evidence, this time for both
leagues, that the source of home teams receiving fewer cards is not just that they are dispropor-
tionately often the favoured team and disproportionately ahead in score.Thus there is evidence
that is consistent with pure referee bias in relative treatments of home and away teams.
Keywords: Bivariate probit; Favouritism; Red cards; Referees; Soccer;Yellow cards
‘It was like playing against 12 men’—Sir Alex Ferguson on the performance of referee Herbert Fandel
after Manchester United’s 2–1 defeat, away to Roma in a Champions’ League match, April 2007.
1. Introduction
In professional soccer, referees are appointed to regulate matches under the Laws of Associ-
ation Football, which are determined by the governing body of world soccer, the Fédération
Internationale de Football Association. In applying these laws referees have sanctions in the
form of cautions (henceforth called ‘yellow cards’) and expulsions of players from the field
Address for correspondence: Robert Simmons, Department of Economics, Management School, Lancaster
University, Lancaster, LA1 4YX, UK.
E-mail: r.simmons@lancaster.ac.uk
432 B. Buraimo, D. Forrest and R. Simmons
(‘red cards’). Although yellow cards are issued for less heinous offences, such as dissent,
deliberate handball, persistent fouling, obstruction and shirt pulling, this sanction offers an
important disincentive to persist in illegal behaviour as a second caution to the same player is
accompanied by dismissal (‘second yellow card’). A red card results from serious misconduct
such as hitting a player or a dangerous tackle or the so-called ‘professional foul’ where a player
deliberately prevents a clear goal scoring opportunity for an opponent by unfair means. Red
cards are relatively infrequent.
Fans, players and head coaches worldwide often complain about both inconsistent applica-
tion of rules by referees and alleged bias against their team. Critical refereeing decisions can
be pivotal for a team’s prospects of winning championships, qualifying for lucrative European
competition or avoiding relegation. As revenue streams, especially sales of broadcast rights,
have grown in European football, so criticism of referees’ behaviour has intensified. This has
begun to be reflected in academic research and various references have investigated particular
sources of bias, inconsistency and favouritism offered by referees in various European leagues,
including England, Germany and Spain. These papers focus on bias in terms of the differential
treatment by referees of home and away teams. Of course, other species of bias could be inves-
tigated: for example, Price and Wolfers (2007) considered racial bias by umpires in American
basketball.
One strand in the football literature examines the amounts of time that are added on by refer-
ees at the end of each half of a game. Referees will stop their clocks immediately if they perceive
a player to be sufficiently injured to warrant treatment on the field. They also receive official
guidance on amounts of time to add for substitutions and are instructed to resist attempts at
time wasting, with cautions if necessary. But the referee takes sole responsibility for timekeeping
and has some discretion over amounts of time played. An influential paper by Garicano et al.
(2005) presented evidence from the Spanish top division that referees awarded less added time
after 90 minutes in games where the home team was ahead and more added time when the home
team was behind. These results were obtained after controlling for numbers of substitutions,
cautions and injuries that would tend to interrupt a match.
Subsequently, other researchers offered broad support for home team favouritism in terms
of added time. Lucey and Power (2004) could replicate the results of Garicano et al. (2005) for
Italian and US Major League soccer. Scoppa (2008) found that referees in Italy’s top division,
Serie A, added significantly greater injury time if home teams were losing. Dohmen (2008) and
Sutter and Kocher (2004) reported that, for the German Bundesliga, referees added more time
in games where the home team was behind. Rickman and Witt (2008) discovered that home
team favouritism in the English top division, the Premier League, as revealed by discretionary
time added by referees, was present at the beginning of their sample period but appeared to
be eradicated when officials were hired on professional employment contracts, with an annual
salary rather than a fee per match. When remuneration incentives changed, referees appeared to
become more conscious of career implications, in terms of renewal of employment, of making
biased judgements regarding time added at the end of games.
Dohmen (2008) added weight to the case that referees are biased by also investigating ‘disput-
able’ and ‘incorrect’ decisions as determined after matches by an independent panel of consul-
tants appointed by the German Football Federation. It appeared that home teams were more
likely to benefit from decisions where a goal was disputable or incorrectly allowed or a penalty
could or could not have been awarded. Intriguingly, though, bias was less evident in grounds
where a running track separated the crowd from the pitch. Referees also seemed, according
to Dohmen’s statistical analysis, not to offer superfluous extra time on grounds with running
tracks and this suggests that the extent and effectiveness of pressure on referees depends on
Refereeing Bias in Soccer 433
the design of the stadium. The supposed mechanism is that referees respond, in presumably a
subconscious way, to the preferences of the crowd when the physical proximity of the crowd is
close.
Dawson et al. (2007) took forward the analysis of possible home bias by referees in a study
based on seven seasons of data from the English Premier League. They distinguished between
home and away team cautions and dismissals in a bivariate negative binomialmodel. They amal-
gamated yellow and red cards into a discrete disciplinary points measure. Although the results
from the yellow cards regression are stated to be similar to those from this points measure, they
did not offer an explicit separate analysis of yellow and red card offences. Their findings are
indicative of bias in favour of home teams in that fewer cards are given to home teams and more
to away teams, after controlling for relative team strengths and the importance of fixtures for
league outcomes. Supporting evidence of referee bias in favour of home teams in the English
Premier League was offered by Boyko et al. (2007). They examined yellow card awards and
penalty decisions in 5244 games and found that there was inconsistent and favourable treatment
of home teams across the 50 referees who were considered. However, a subsequent replication
study by Johnston (2008) that used more recent data from the Premier League failed to confirm
this result.
The prior literature on disciplinary sanctions that was reviewed above uses the match as the
unit of observation and this raises issues about controlling for within-game effects. At the match
level, for example, it might be thought that part of the reason for more cards on average for
away teams is that they are more often than not the underdog, given home advantage, and
will therefore typically play more defensively, tackle more often and thereby be penalized more
frequently. Dawson et al. (2007) found residual bias against away teams even accounting for the
match level factors of which team is the underdog and the extent to which it is the underdog.
These characteristics were determined from pre-match probabilities of a win for the respective
teams as generated from a match result forecasting model. In the majority of matches in any
league, the home team will be the favourite. However, the style of play of each team will vary
not only by the pre-match prospects based on home advantage and team strength but also by
events unfolding as the game progresses. A team that is behind in score may become more des-
perate and commit more offences. Controlling more precisely for the effect of playing style on
award of sanctions therefore requires the use of information on within-game score. Only then
can the effect of playing style on sanctions be separated from refereeing bias. Otherwise what
is attributed as referee bias may simply result from excessive effort by the offending teams. In
particular, away teams may receive more yellow cards in the aggregate just because, on average,
they spend more of the game trailing their opponents in score and therefore resort to more
foul play. Taking into account events within the game requires a finer level of analysis than the
match, which was the unit of observation in Dawson et al. (2007). Of course, the team attribute
of being ‘underdog’ does not vary through the game. But the manifestation of that attribute, in
terms of player misbehaviour and hence referee sanctions, will vary through games according
to the state of the match score and it is this within-game variation in sanctions that we analyse
in this paper.
Our contribution to the study of referee bias in football therefore departs from the existing
literature by acknowledging the potential importance of within-game dynamics. We switch from
match to minute of game as the unit of observation. Rather than model the number of cau-
tions and dismissals as count variables (as in Dawson et al. (2007)), we model the probability
of a caution or dismissal within a specific minute of a match. This permits us to introduce a
full set of relevant within-game covariates such as the number of yellow and red cards that
are issued up to the minute and the difference in score at the start of the minute. Specifically,
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we set up a bivariate probit model (see Greene (2003), pages 710–719, for a formal exposi-
tion) in which the likelihood that a card is issued is determined for home and away teams
jointly. Thus the two events of home team sanction and away team sanction are modelled
simultaneously, and conditionally on sets of explanatory variables they are considered jointly
dependent.
A further innovation in the paper is to bring together results from two leagues over the same
time period. The literature to date reads as a set of cases, with one league analysed at a time.
Here, we can present evidence of refereeing bias, using an analysis of yellow and red cards from
two major European football leagues, not just one. The application to more than one league
facilitates a search for corroborating evidence. Here, we undertake parallel analyses of the two
countries, since differences in playing styles and referees’ behaviour are likely to be systematic
across the two leagues, rendering pooling of games invalid. Our sample period for each league
covers the 2000–2001 to 2005–2006 seasons, which are a period of time when there were no
radical changes in the rules of football.
2. Data and model
We propose two pairs of dependent variables. The first pair comprises binary indicators of the
award of a specific type of card to home and away teams in a given minute of a match. For
example, we model the joint responses of a home team given a yellow card and an away team
given a yellow card. We then repeat the procedure for a home team given a red card and an
away team given a red card, again modelled jointly. Unlike the Premier League, the Bundesliga
features some stadia where a running track separates the crowd from the pitch and we wish
to investigate whether this structural feature of football grounds has any effect on referees’
behaviour in the award of sanctions. For this reason, models for the Bundesliga incorporate this
feature but not the models for the English Premier League.
Following Dohmen (2008), we hypothesize that crowd pressure on referees will decrease when
a track is present. We conjecture that referees will feel less intimidated in their decisions to award
yellow and red cards to home teams when a track separates referees from the crowd. We con-
struct a dummy variable, track, to capture the presence of a running track in a stadium. Then,
the hypothesis to be tested is that home teams have a higher probability of receipt of a card
and/or away teams have a lower probability of receipt of a card when a track is present.
The top division of the Bundesliga has 18 teams and our data set spans six seasons, giving a
total of 108 team–season observations. Data on tracks in stadia, which were kindly provided
by Joachim Prinz of the University of Paderborn, show that the number of team–season obser-
vations with tracks is 39 out of 108. The clubs that played in a stadium with a track varied
over time. Three teams actually changed their ground structure during our sample period. Both
Schalke, in 2001, and Bayern Munich, in 2005, moved to a new stadium without a running
track. Hannover, in 2003, renovated its old stadium, removing the existing running track.
In a paper on referee bias in Italian football, Pettersson-Lidbom and Priks (2007) argued
that referees were more likely to award yellow and red cards to home team players where the
authorities had ordered games to be played in empty stadia following previous crowd trouble.
However, it should be noted that, of their sample of 842 games across the top two divisions in
Italian football, only 24 were played in empty stadia. Further, Pettersson-Lidbom and Priks did
not control for within-game influences on the award of cards. Most importantly for our analysis,
the empty Italian stadia in their study tended to be those belonging to clubs with a record of
crowd trouble at home games and the ‘empty stadium’ effect on the award of cards may simply
be a team-specific effect. By contrast, in our case of theBundesliga, we have a substantial number
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of ‘with-track’ game observations. Crucially, with some of the Bundesliga teams switching
stadium design in the sample period, our track variable is not confounded with home-
team-specific effects on treatment by referees and enables their separate identification.
Another dimension of stadium architecture is the size of the pitch, which is not homogeneous.
The Laws of Association Football merely specify the minimum and maximum length and width
of approved pitches. However, the variation in pitch dimensions across the Bundesliga is small,
with the range of both length and width being just 5 m. Further, the presence of a running track
does not appear to be correlated with the size of the pitch. Our conclusion is that any effects
that we attribute to the presence of a track are unlikely merely to be reflecting factors that are
associated with the size of the pitch as for example in any tendency in football for conflict to be
greater where teams confront each other in a confined space.
As indicated previously our initial focus will be on the joint modelling of home and away
team responses of yellow and red cards. Later in the paper, we shall also offer empirical results
from estimation where the home and away classification is replaced by a different configuration:
that of favourite team and underdog team. There the pairs of dependent variables will be the
probabilities of cards of a particular colour being awarded to the favourite and underdog teams,
as assessed by the bookmaker betting market for match results.
This alternative classification of team responses, between favourite and underdog, allows us
to address the issue of home team bias directly by modelling the probability that a team will
be awarded a particular card in the next minute of a match with a specific dummy variable
included to reflect whether a team is home or away. To estimate the two equations, including
the dummy of whether or not the underdog team is at home, which we call the ‘home underdog’
or equivalently whether the favourite team is the away team, requires that the favourite teams
have a mix of home and away teams among them. We emphasize that, although the majority
of favourite teams in our two samples are home teams, there are still some games in each league
where the home team is the underdog, and we can capture this feature by using a dummy
variable. Accordingly we adopt an alternative perspective on each match from that taken earlier
in the home–away analysis. A convenient dichotomy is between teams that were favourites or
underdogs in the betting market. A small number of matches had equal win probabilities for
the two teams so there was no favourite and these games were excluded from the sample.
As noted above, the use of minute of game as the unit of observation allows us to control
for within-game influences on the award of cards. We have data on times of yellow and red
cards and goals scored for the English Premier League and Bundesliga 1, obtained from www.
11v11.co.uk and http://www.bundesliga.de. In general, the two sites offer consis-
tency in timing of cards and goals. The Bundesliga site has a peculiar feature in that it records
minute 0 as the beginning and minute 89 as the end of a match. We added 1 minute on for each
card and goal taken from the German site to provide consistency with the English data. There
are occasions where more than one card is issued to the same team in a particular minute and,
when that happens, we simply record ‘1’; there is therefore an extent to which this recording of
cards slightly understates the total.
Our sources permit us to separate the data into yellow card, second yellow card and red card
categories. By yellow card, we mean the first caution that is awarded in a game to a given player.
Our variable ‘yellow card’ does not include instances of a second yellow card that is shown to the
same player since this has different implications: automatically the player is shown a red card as
well and therefore is dismissed from the field. Below, our category ‘all red cards’ includes both
these ‘second yellows’ and the ‘straight reds’ that are handed out for offences that are sufficiently
serious to merit immediate dismissal. Clearly, yellow cards occur much more frequently than
red cards.
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Table 1 shows the incidence of yellow and red cards per match in the top division of the
Bundesliga and in the English Premier League, separated into 15-minute segments. It is clear
that, generally, the frequency of cards is greater with the passage of time in a match. Also, the
frequency of yellow cards is higher for the Bundesliga than for the English Premier League,
possibly reflecting a more severe interpretation of the Laws of the Game in Germany.
Table 1 also reveals the rarity of dismissals, relative to cautions. This is itself a consequence
of incentives. When a player receives a red card, his team plays with 10 men and evidence shows
that teams with 11 men have a greater chance of winning against 10 men compared with 11,
although this depends on the timing of dismissal and hence how much time is left for the team
with full strength to exploit its advantage (Ridder et al., 1994; Torgler, 2004; Caliendo and
Radic, 2006). If the depleted team loses the game then the dismissed player may receive blame
from fans and coaches for the defeat. For instance, in press conferences head coaches sometimes
speak of an ‘unnecessary dismissal’ when a player performs a reckless act that induces a red
card. Unless the dismissal is found to be unfair on appeal, the player will also serve a suspension
with a minimum of three games for a straight red card and may receive a fine if the offence was
very serious. The suspension has career implications for the player in that a replacement may
claim and retain the player’s place, even when the suspended player becomes available again. As
a result, the kind of severe offences that are found in amateur football, such as fighting between
players, are far less prevalent in the professional game.
We distinguish between control variables for within-game and pre-game influences. In the
former category, we include minute and minute squared as covariates since it appears that, the
longer the match continues, the more likely it is that a card will be issued. Also, we should
note that neither Web site records time added at the end of each half and so the 45th and 90th
minutes will typically last longer than others because they include ‘injury time’. We account for
this feature of the data by using dummy variables, 45th minute and 90th minute. The dynamics
of previous yellow cards are included by separating numbers of cards that are issued to home
and away teams in the preceding 3 minutes, home yellow last 3 minutes and away yellow last 3
minutes, from numbers of cards issued earlier in the game than the preceding 3 minutes, home
yellow prior and away yellow prior.
Table 1. Referees’ awards of cards in the Bundesliga and Premier
League in all games
Minutes Home Away Home 2nd Away 2nd Home Away
yellow yellow yellow yellow red red
Germany (1836 games)
1–15 239 267 0 0 1 3
16–30 437 615 4 7 7 7
31–45 673 758 8 23 14 22
46–60 521 631 7 17 10 24
61–75 622 766 6 31 13 27
75–90 767 942 25 35 25 41
England (2280 games)
1–15 174 258 0 1 3 9
16–30 344 494 3 3 16 9
31–45 587 771 6 15 12 14
46–60 474 631 6 11 17 16
61–75 573 768 14 29 26 34
75–90 746 984 31 49 31 35
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The choice of 3 minutes as the timeframe within which to treat earlier yellow card incidents
as recent was determined from preliminary investigation. In the 1- or 2-minute period following
a caution or dismissal, there is little opportunity for either team to react in terms of illegal
behaviour. The referee may have to calm players down following protests about decisions and
usually a free kick or penalty will be awarded, all of which takes up time. Our results are robust
to alternative choices of 4, 5 and 6 minutes and regressions with these longer intervals yielded
slightly lower pseudo-R2-values. On this basis we selected 3 minutes as our threshold for recent
events.
Numbers of straight red cards issued in the game before the subject minute are captured by
home red and away red. Numbers of second yellow cards issued previously in the match are
similarly captured by home 2nd yellow and away 2nd yellow. The effects of these within-game
dynamic effects cannot be signed a priori. On the one hand, an extra card to a team may reduce
the probability that a further card will be issued to the same team: a deterrence effect. On the
other hand, an extra card to a team may be part of an escalation in illegal conflict between
teams. Also, observers sometimes claim that referees have a tendency to ‘even out’ decisions so
that a caution that is given to one team is followed by another to its opponent, but we cannot
distinguish this from conflict escalation that is generated by the players themselves. Our set
of variables covering previous yellow and red cards serves to control for dynamics of conflict
during a game.
Illegal activitymay also increase as teams fall behind andwe register the goal difference, which
is defined as home team current score minus away team current score as the match status at any
point in time.
Teams that are behind in score, which are more often away than home teams, are hypothe-
sized to generate extra effort in an attempt to negate the deficit and some of this extra effort will
spill over into illegal activity, which is punishable by cautions or dismissals. This illegal effort
was characterized by Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2006) as ‘sabotage in tournaments’, where
players attempt to reduce the effectiveness of opponents by unfair means. The propensity to
undertake sabotage activity will be enhanced for a team that is behind in score.
The effect of goal difference on the probability of receiving a card of a particular colour
may therefore depend, first, on which team is ahead in score and, second, on the difference
in score at the time. For example, one extra goal from a 3–0 scoreline may have a different
influence on the probability of receiving a card for the home team compared with one from
a scoreline of 0–0. In the former case, the effort of the home team may be less intense as the
game is virtually decided and a lower probability of home card may be a consequence. The
effort of the away team could also of course become less intense as its deficit becomes large. To
capture this possible non-linearity of effects, we introduce the quadratic term, goal difference
squared.
Some football matches are notable for the intense rivalry that they generate among support-
ers and players; the result of tradition and independent of current team league standings and
prospects. These matches are generally played between two local teams that are a short distance
apart. Witt (2005) used distance between stadia of competing teams to capture the influence
of local rivalry. Here we nominate a particular set of rivalrous games denoted by derby and
predict that these will generate a higher probability of a caution or dismissal for each team.
In Germany, there is typically much greater average distance between teams than in England
and so far fewer local derbies are to be found in the Bundesliga, which has just six team pairs,
following the list that was provided by Benz et al. (2009).
The extent of pressure that is exerted by fans may be positively related to the size of crowd
and we proxy crowd intensity by the logarithm of match attendance (log attendance). Dawson
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et al. (2007) used this measure as a covariate in their analysis of disciplinary points.
We also include a measure of ex ante relative team strength. Dawson et al. (2007) used an
elaborate statistical forecasting model to generate win probabilities for the respective teams in a
match. An alternative is to derive a relative team strength measure from betting odds. This has
the advantage that odds will incorporate not only information from previous matches, as in the
statistical model, but also fresh news such as that pertaining to absences of players from injury
or suspension. Of course, reliance on bookmakers’ odds to capture relative team strengths,
as modified by home advantage, depends on the betting market being efficient. In the sample
period that was employed by Dawson et al. (2007), there is evidence that it was not fully so
(Forrest and Simmons, 2002) and a statistical model may indeed have been a more appropriate
basis for deriving win probabilities.
However, since the abolition of betting tax in 2001, and as the growth of Internet competi-
tion has put pressure on bookmakers’ margins, there is evidence (Forrest et al., 2005) that the
betting market has moved strongly towards displaying efficiency, i.e. towards odds capturing
accurately all the factors that are relevant to the outcome of a match. Accordingly we choose
to exploit odds data, from Ladbrokes, the largest UK bookmaker, and include in our model
difference in bookmaker probability, which is defined as home win probability minus away win
probability and, to capture non-linearity, its square. This variable is a proxy for ex ante relative
team strengths. The larger the value of this variable, the stronger the relative strength of the
home side and, we predict, the less or more likely that the home or away team respectively is to
be awarded cards.
Using the bivariate probit link function we then jointly model the probabilities that the home
team will receive a yellow card and the away team a yellow card in a minute period. The probit
model incorporates for both probabilities the covariates which have been fully defined above:
minute, minute squared, 45th minute, 90th minute, home yellow last 3 minutes, away yellow
last 3 minutes, home yellow prior, away yellow prior, home 2nd yellow, away 2nd yellow, home
red, away red, goal difference, goal difference squared, track, log attendance, derby, difference
in bookmaker probability and difference in bookmaker probability squared.
Additionally, to account for grouping of observations into referees, covariates for fixed effects
of referees were included in all the model specifications. Similarly included were sets of dummy
variables for effects of the specific home team, the specific away team and the season of observa-
tions. A separate bivariate probit analysis was undertaken for home and away straight red cards
by using the same set of covariates. As before, these models include home team, away team,
referee and season effects.
Subsequently in the paper, models for both yellow and straight red cards and an additional
model for the category of red cards induced by a second caution are fitted, but now the two
joint probabilities in each model are for the favourite team and the underdog team. The control
dummy variables for team, season and referee fixed effects are again included in these models.
The covariates that are used in this set of models are now minute, minute squared, 45th minute,
90th minute, favourite yellow last 3 minutes, underdog yellow last 3 minutes, favourite yellow
prior, underdog yellow prior, favourite 2nd yellow, underdog 2nd yellow, favourite red, under-
dog red, goal difference, goal difference squared, home underdog match, derby and difference
in bookmaker probability. Here, of course, the goal and bookmaker probability variables are
defined in terms of favourite team value minus underdog team value.
Our data are multilevel and are clustered by match. This induces correlation between obser-
vations within matches. The model estimation which we discuss in the next section assumes
independence of error terms across matches but incorporates an adjustment for interdepen-
dence of error terms within matches to produce robust standard error estimates.
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3. Empirical results
We begin with a descriptive analysis of referees’ propensities to award yellow and red cards
in the Bundesliga and the Premier League. The matches in our samples were officiated by 35
referees in the Bundesliga and 36 referees in the Premier League. Some referees were in charge
of small numbers of games: just one in some instances. The average number of games officiated
is 52 in the Bundesliga and 63 in the Premier League. The standard deviations are 36 and 47
respectively. In each league, referees are obliged to retire at the age of 48 years, so our sample
includes some referees who had just begun careers at the top level and others who retired or were
demoted during the sample period. An analysis of duration of career and referees’ performance
in the Bundesliga was presented by Frick et al. (2008).
Focusing on referees who officiated at least 25 games, we consider the mean number of each
type of card for home and away teams. There are two immediate results from t-tests, which
were conducted with samples of unequal variance. First, referees in each league tended to award
fewer cards per game to home teams than to away teams, though this was not necessarily due to
referee bias as away teams are more often involved in defensive play as they struggle to overcome
home advantage. The only exception to this generalization was the case of straight red cards in
England where the null hypothesis of equality of cards per game for home and away teams is
not rejected (p=0:31). Second, English referees tended to award fewer yellow cards per game
than their German colleagues, irrespectively of whether the team was home or away. For both
home and away teams these differences between England and Germany are statistically highly
significant. However, for straight red cards and also, for home team only, second yellow cards,
English referees were no less severe than German referees. Differences in incidence of cards
across leagues could reflect different degrees of aggression; the industry stereotype is that the
Premier League is faster paced,more physical andmore attack oriented than theBundesliga. But
differences in interpretation of the Laws of the Game may also play a part. Offences meriting
straight red cards involve more clear-cut decisions by referees compared with yellow cards,
where there is greater scope for discretion.
Table 2 shows estimates of the parameters of bivariate probit models for the probabilities
of yellow cards given to home and away teams, separately for each league. Table 3 has the
corresponding results for the red card responses. The parameter estimates for the covariates
in all the tables are their coefficients in a linear function, which in a probit model predicts a
monotonic transformation F−1.p/ of a probability p where F−1 is the inverse of the cumulative
distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Estimation is maximum likelihood
implemented in Stata 10 by the biprobit command with the option cluster to adjust standard
error estimates to account for within-match dependences of observations (Stata, 2007). The
tables also report an estimate of ρ, which represents the residual correlation between the joint
responses in the model, after fitting the covariates. If ρ is 0, then separate probit models for
the response would be appropriate rather than their being jointly dependent. A test for the null
hypothesis of zero ρ is provided by comparing the log-likelihood for the bivariate probit models
with sum of log-likelihoods of the separate univariate probit models. In all our bivariate probit
results in Tables 2–6, this null hypothesis is always rejected at the 1% level. In some cases the
estimate of ρ is also quite large. This justifies our use of bivariate probit rather than separate
probit models for home–away and favourite–underdog equations.
Ourcontrolvariablesshowstatisticallysignificant,plausibleandimportanteffects fromwithin-
game dynamics in both leagues. The explanatory power of the models drops markedly when
within-game control variables are removed. For example, in Table 2, the pseudo-R2 drops from
0.026 to 0.005 when within-game controls are removed from the Bundesliga yellow card model.
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Table 2. Bivariate probit regression results for yellow card†
Covariate coefficient Results for Results for
Bundesliga model Premier League model
Home team Away team Home team Away team
Within game
Minute 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
(12.02) (13.00) (11.38) (13.07)
Minute squared −0.000098 −0.000096 −0.000099 −0.000101
(7.51) (7.86) (7.41) (8.32)
45th minute 0.346 0.273 0.437 0.534
(6.55) (5.23) (8.99) (12.63)
90th minute 0.526 0.550 0.638 0.735
(10.34) (11.61) (13.81) (17.86)
Home yellow last 3 minutes −0.249 0.120 −0.032 0.195
(6.90) (4.33) (0.92) (7.04)
Away yellow last 3 minutes 0.102 −0.174 0.156 −0.104
(3.77) (6.17) (5.44) (3.64)
Home yellow prior −0.088 0.016 −0.043 0.050
(8.42) (1.78) (4.36) (5.48)
Away yellow prior 0.024 −0.084 0.046 −0.066
(2.64) (9.53) (5.19) (7.13)
Home 2nd yellow −0.114 0.132 0.023 −0.004
(1.16) (2.06) (0.37) (0.05)
Away 2nd yellow 0.057 −0.042 0.017 −0.032
(1.09) (0.84) (0.31) (0.53)
Home red 0.039 0.105 0.010 0.078
(0.71) (1.99) (0.19) (1.89)
Away red 0.043 −0.022 −0.023 −0.035
(0.88) (0.48) (0.44) (0.66)
Goal difference −0.025 0.019 −0.028 0.030
(3.49) (2.96) (3.82) (4.43)
Goal difference squared −0.015 −0.015 −0.011 −0.020




Log attendance 0.040 −0.010 −0.014 −0.025
(1.03) (0.27) (0.17) (0.37)
Derby −0.002 0.057 0.074 0.111
(0.03) (1.47) (3.00) (4.88)
Difference in bookmaker probability 0.047 0.256 −0.014 0.093
(0.76) (4.19) (0.27) (1.92)
Difference in bookmaker probability squared −0.423 −0.366 −0.334 −0.213
(3.15) (3.18) (3.52) (2.57)
Constant −2.906 −2.210 −2.186 −2.144
(6.50) (5.23) (2.63) (3.00)




Number of observations (minutes) 159210 204480
†Dependent responses are teams receiving a card in a given minute. Estimates are for coefficients of co-
variates in the probit model linear predictor of F−1.p/ where p is the probability of receiving the card. In
parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics, computed by using robust standard errors adjusting for clustering
of observations within matches. Models are estimated jointly for home and away teams in each league but sepa-
rately for the Bundesliga and Premier League. Models also include sets of dummy variables for the fixed effects of
referee, home teams, away teams and year. Results for these are not reported.
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Table 3. Bivariate probit regression results for straight red card†
Covariate coefficient Results for Results for
Bundesliga model Premier League model
Home team Away team Home team Away team
Within game
Minute 0.013 0.018 0.010 0.007
(2.25) (3.09) (2.25) (1.30)
Minute squared −0.000073 −0.000136 −0.000062 −0.000011
(1.11) (2.41) (1.31) (0.22)
45th minute 0.113 0.243 0.189 0.170
(0.40) (1.41) (0.89) (0.84)
90th minute 0.730 0.679 0.331 0.538
(4.50) (5.49) (2.04) (4.42)
Home yellow last 3 minutes 0.276 0.154 0.115 −0.050
(2.55) (1.62) (1.07) (0.39)
Away yellow last 3 minutes −0.205 0.117 0.011 0.250
(1.42) (1.32) (0.10) (2.44)
Home yellow prior 0.013 0.067 −0.020 −0.031
(0.36) (2.21) (0.55) (0.88)
Away yellow prior 0.010 0.017 0.068 0.053
(0.25) (0.60) (2.20) (1.59)
Home 2nd yellow −4.797 0.348 −4.539 0.190
(19.55) (2.06) (27.33) (0.95)
Away 2nd yellow −0.046 0.175 0.102 −4.835
(0.24) (1.25) (0.54) (32.48)
Home red −0.177 0.226 −0.156 0.316
(1.21) (1.46) (1.35) (2.55)
Away red 0.232 −0.293 0.314 −0.168
(1.35) (1.94) (2.44) (1.31)
Goal difference −0.125 0.094 −0.111 0.082
(3.41) (3.32) (3.98) (1.99)
Goal difference squared −0.057 −0.021 −0.004 −0.046




Log attendance −0.282 −0.419 0.381 0.290
(1.76) (2.82) (1.18) (0.98)
Derby −0.082 0.078 0.073 0.021
(0.43) (0.51) (0.73) (0.24)
Difference in bookmaker probability −0.541 −0.247 0.449 0.107
(2.24) (1.25) (1.97) (0.56)
Difference in bookmaker probability squared −0.336 −0.156 −1.142 −0.188
(0.63) (0.32) (2.58) (0.55)
Constant −1.199 0.331 −8.262 −6.597
(0.66) (0.20) (2.42) (2.15)




Number of observations (minutes) 159210 204480
†The footnote for Table 2 applies here also.
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An extra yellow card that is received by the home team previously in the match, whether in
the immediately preceding 3 minutes or before that, is associated with a reduced probability of
receiving a home team yellow card in the current minute. Similarly, the probability of away team
yellow cards is negatively related to prior incidence of away team yellow cards. These results are
consistent with the intended deterrent effect of cautions.
By contrast, an extra yellow card received previously in the match by either a home or an
away team, whether in the immediately preceding 3 minutes or before that, is associated with
an increased probability of receiving a yellow card for its opponents in the current minute. In
Table 2, the number of previous second yellow cards in a match is only significant with positive
coefficient for the probability that a Bundesliga away team receives a yellow card. However,
Table 3 shows that the number of previous second yellow cards in a match has particular
relevance for the likelihood of another red card.
An extra goal scoredby the home team,with away score constant, is shown to lead to a reduced
probability that a home teamwill receive a yellow card in each league. The negative coefficient on
goal difference squared shows that the effect of increasing goal difference increasingly lowers
the probability that a home team will receive a yellow card. Thus an extra goal for the home
team results in a lower probability that a home team will receive a yellow card at both 1–0 and
3–0 but there is a higher absolute marginal effect in the latter case.
An extra home team goal also leads to an increased probability that an away team will receive
a yellow card if the away team is behind in score, this time with an inverted U-shaped relation-
ship between yellow card probability and goal difference. Turning points in both the Bundesliga
and the Premiership are between zero and a one-goal deficit for the away team. Hence, a change
in goal difference from 0–2 to 0–1 is associated with an increased probability of receiving a
yellow card for the away team. But a change in goal difference from 1–0 to 2–0 is associated
with a lower probability of receiving a yellow card for the away team. These results therefore
confirm that controlling for goal supremacy during the match is an important feature of our
model and that use of a non-linear functional form yields interesting and plausible results. They
suggest, for example, that much of the aggression that is seen in top level football is controlled:
as the home club’s lead becomes decisive, both teams become less likely to attract sanctions,
presumably because the expected pay-off to committing offences is now low.
Turning to pre-game covariates, we note that derby matches in England generate an increased
probability of cautions for each team, but this effect is absent in Germany where there are far
fewer fixtures of intense local rivalry. Attendance is not a significant predictor of the likeli-
hood of caution in either league. We also tested for significance of crowd density measured as
attendance divided by ground capacity and, further, for attendance interacted with track in the
Bundesliga model. Neither of these additional attendance terms was significant and they are
excluded from the model. Another factor that might exert an influence is the composition of the
crowd between home and away supporters. Unfortunately, data on the composition of crowds
are not available in either England or Germany and so we could not test for crowd composition
effects on the likelihood of sanctions. However, in the case of England, crowd composition does
not seem likely to vary very much. A high proportion of games are played in stadia where all
tickets are routinely sold with only a small and fixed percentage of them made available to the
visiting club.
An increase in difference in the bookmaker’s win probability for the home team relative to the
away team is found to be associated with a reduced likelihood that the home team will receive
a yellow card. By contrast, a consideration of the combined linear and quadratic effects from
an increase in the difference in bookmakers probability shows an increased likelihood that an
away team will receive a yellow card. For example, the turning point for the Bundesliga is where
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the difference in bookmakers probability is approximately 0.36. This is beyond the maximum
value that is observed in the sample. Thus, within the sample range, the association between the
probability of an away yellow and the difference in bookmaker win probability is positive. Given
efficiency in the bookmakers’ betting market for match results, these results suggest that ex ante
relative team strength is a significant predictor of the likelihood of cautions for the competing
teams in a match. The greater the likely superiority of the home team, as signalled by betting
odds, the fewer yellow cards the home team is predicted to receive and the more yellow cards
the away team is predicted to receive.
We can test for refereeing bias in theBundesliga through the exploitation of information about
the presence of a running track in stadia (Dohmen, 2008). The inclusion of the dummy variable
track accounts forwhether the crowdwas orwas not separated from the field of play by a running
track. This is an irrelevant consideration for the Premier League where no stadium has a track.
The results in Table 2 show that, controlling for both within-game and pre-game effects, home
teams face an increased probability of receiving a yellow cardwhere there is a track, with a coeffi-
cient that is significant beyond the 5% level. We also see from Table 3 that the track has a positive
effect on the home team’s probability of receiving a red card. However, owing to the much lower
frequency of home red cards relative to home yellow cards and consequent low precision of the
parameter estimate, the effect of track is only marginally significantly different from 0 (t =1:72).
That whether there is a running track has a statistically significant influence on the probability
that a home team receives a yellow card could, in principle, follow from modification of either
referee or player behaviour. For referees, the presence of a track creates less intimidation and
noise from the crowd. If referees react to this change in atmosphere, it would be expected to
be in the direction of issuing more cards to the home team. For home players, a running track
also changes the atmosphere. They will be less subject to being enthused by their supporters;
less ‘stirred up’. If home players react to this change, it would be expected to be in the direction
of playing less intensely and less aggressively and, as a consequence, they should receive fewer
cards. The two effects, through referee and player responses, work in opposite directions. That
the net effect of a running track is to increase cards issued to home players suggests that the
result is being driven by the referee’s response to the proximity of the crowd and this is consistent
with referees typically being biased towards the home team because of the presence of partisan
spectators. It is an example of ‘favouritism under social pressure’ (Garicano et al., 2005).
The findings on refereeing bias in the Bundesliga here are consistent with those of Dohmen
(2008) who examined data from independent consultants, who were appointed by the German
Football Federation, on correctness of referees’ decisions to award penalty kicks. More penal-
ties were awarded to home teams in stadia without a running track. This suggests, reinforced by
our result, that, given equal revenue-generating potential, the removal of a running track was a
rational decision by the three Bundesliga 1 clubs that did so in our sample period.
Behind all these findings may be that pressure on the referee is exerted through the volume
of noise. Nevill et al. (2002) performed an experiment in which two sets of referees viewed a
videotape of a Premier League match under different conditions and were asked to nominate
the award of free kicks. One set viewed the replay with the sound of fan noise eliminated while
the other group watched with sound retained. The latter group offered more decisions in favour
of the home team.
We turn next to results based on estimating the models for the probability that cards will be
issued to favourite and underdog teams as specified in Section 2. The covariates are similar to
those before except that we now exclude those (track and log attendance) that are associated
with the identity of the home team. Here, teams are defined according to whether they were the
favourite or the underdog in a match. Each category includes a mix of home and away teams.
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Table 4. Bivariate probit model of yellow card with favourites and underdogs†
Covariate coefficient Results for Results for
Bundesliga model Premier League model
Favourite team Underdog team Favourite team Underdog team
Within game
Minute 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.015
(11.30) (12.97) (11.44) (12.50)
Minute squared −0.000085 −0.000102 −0.000100 −0.000098
(6.46) (8.23) (7.48) (7.89)
45th minute 0.336 0.285 0.457 0.521
(6.21) (5.42) (9.47) (11.95)
90th minute 0.510 0.558 0.637 0.731
(10.03) (11.49) (13.61) (17.44)
Favourite yellow last 3 minutes −0.196 0.089 −0.022 0.174
(6.02) (3.15) (0.66) (6.11)
Underdog yellow last 3 minutes 0.119 −0.196 0.166 −0.090
(4.37) (6.40) (5.79) (3.02)
Favourite yellow prior −0.081 0.007 −0.035 0.046
(7.74) (0.82) (3.54) (5.06)
Underdog yellow prior 0.022 −0.082 0.042 −0.063
(2.50) (9.10) (4.51) (6.58)
Favourite 2nd yellow −0.072 0.141 −0.004 −0.024
(0.78) (2.04) (0.06) (0.30)
Underdog 2nd yellow 0.024 −0.057 0.029 −0.003
(0.48) (1.09) (0.48) (0.06)
Favourite red 0.119 0.111 0.047 0.026
(2.31) (1.98) (0.82) (0.57)
Underdog red 0.011 −0.044 0.007 −0.025
(0.21) (0.93) (0.15) (0.53)
Goal difference −0.011 0.004 −0.017 0.019
(1.47) (0.65) (2.35) (2.77)
Goal difference squared −0.018 −0.010 −0.014 −0.016
(5.77) (3.74) (3.75) (5.26)
Pre-game
Home underdog match −0.010 −0.127 0.090 −0.134
(0.42) (5.49) (3.90) (5.89)
Derby 0.030 0.022 0.065 0.116
(0.64) (0.50) (2.53) (4.86)
Difference in bookmaker probability −0.229 0.002 −0.236 −0.013
(3.84) (0.05) (4.22) (0.27)
Constant −2.301 −2.323 −2.356 −2.360
(27.48) (29.46) (34.02) (33.75)




Number of observations (minutes) 154980 198180
†The footnote for Table 2 applies here also.
Consequently, any effects from track and log attendance could be captured only by employing
a set of interaction terms, which would make an unwieldy model. We focus instead on the very
clear question of whether it makes a difference to the number of cards according to whether a
team is playing at home or away. This can be inferred from the coefficients on the variable home
underdog match.
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Table 5. Bivariate probit model of straight red card with favourites and underdogs†
Covariate coefficient Results for Results for
Bundesliga model Premier League model
Favourite team Underdog team Favourite team Underdog team
Within game
Minute 0.016 0.013 0.017 0.005
(5.93) (2.35) (7.30) (1.05)
Minute squared −0.000087 −0.000065 −0.000118 −0.000010
(3.08) (1.23) (4.94) (0.22)
45th minute 0.196 0.173 0.468 0.269
(1.62) (0.85) (5.99) (1.53)
90th minute 0.628 0.512 0.665 0.457
(6.54) (3.94) (8.62) (3.37)
Favourite yellow last 3 minutes −0.128 0.147 −0.097 −0.073
(2.09) (1.59) (1.85) (0.56)
Underdog yellow last 3 minutes 0.157 0.080 0.175 0.330
(2.78) (0.85) (3.51) (3.82)
Favourite yellow prior −0.129 0.036 −0.072 −0.007
(6.48) (1.15) (3.95) (0.22)
Underdog yellow prior 0.050 0.021 0.057 0.050
(2.53) (0.80) (3.33) (1.48)
Favourite 2nd yellow 0.045 0.177 −0.066 0.295
(0.37) (0.76) (0.46) (1.67)
Underdog 2nd yellow 0.072 0.027 0.047 −4.839
(0.99) (0.17) (0.43) (26.99)
Favourite red 0.116 −0.143 0.108 0.311
(1.28) (0.70) (0.98) (2.70)
Underdog red 0.140 −0.181 0.149 −0.178
(1.10) (1.19) (1.96) (1.44)
Goal difference 0.040 0.058 0.023 0.018
(2.64) (2.34) (1.86) (0.58)
Goal difference squared −0.038 −0.015 −0.021 −0.016
(4.86) (1.31) (3.47) (1.02)
Pre-game
Home underdog match 1.384 −0.039 1.230 −0.030
(22.25) (0.45) (22.20) (0.33)
Derby 0.001 −0.044 0.143 −0.038
(0.01) (0.24) (3.32) (0.40)
Difference in bookmaker probability −0.365 −0.269 0.228 −0.535
(2.81) (1.03) (0.71) (1.00)
Constant −3.776 −3.913 −3.753 −3.512
(20.05) (10.21) (22.21) (12.21)




Number of observations (minutes) 154980 198180
†The footnote for Table 2 applies here also.
The variable, difference in bookmaker probability, is retained. Of course, this variable is now
constrained to the positive range, since the favourite, by definition, has the higher win probabil-
ity. Continuing to control for win probabilities is key here. As in Dawson et al. (2007), it should
be recognized that the reason for a greater incidence of yellow cards for visiting teams might
be that typically they are underdogs and may therefore attempt to employ more foul play as an
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Table 6. Bivariate probit model of red card (including 2nd yellow) with favourites and underdogs†
Covariate coefficient Results for Results for
Bundesliga model Premier League model
Favourite team Underdog team Favourite team Underdog team
Within game
Minute 0.016 0.018 0.017 0.006
(6.04) (4.31) (7.25) (1.52)
Minute squared −0.000082 −0.000108 −0.000112 −0.000018
(3.08) (2.70) (4.83) (0.47)
45th minute 0.165 0.171 0.473 0.414
(1.41) (1.07) (6.28) (3.20)
90th minute 0.595 0.515 0.686 0.477
(6.61) (4.85) (9.39) (4.76)
Favourite yellow last 3 minutes −0.097 0.149 −0.039 0.022
(1.68) (2.06) (0.79) (0.26)
Underdog yellow last 3 minutes 0.128 0.156 0.166 0.397
(2.37) (2.30) (3.45) (6.17)
Favourite yellow prior −0.103 0.030 −0.030 −0.000
(5.49) (1.32) (1.82) (0.01)
Underdog yellow prior 0.043 0.014 0.046 0.153
(2.46) (0.70) (2.89) (7.48)
Favourite red 0.116 0.153 0.151 0.227
(1.36) (1.24) (1.52) (2.74)
Underdog red 0.118 −0.152 0.096 −0.187
(1.02) (1.32) (1.37) (1.59)
Goal difference 0.034 0.046 0.018 0.012
(2.37) (2.50) (1.55) (0.59)
Goal difference squared −0.037 −0.006 −0.022 −0.005
(5.02) (0.87) (3.94) (0.53)
Pre-game
Home underdog match 1.242 −0.183 1.099 −0.065
(24.45) (2.63) (23.74) (0.89)
Derby −0.012 −0.017 0.160 −0.103
(0.15) (0.14) (3.96) (1.31)
Difference in bookmaker probability −0.218 −0.442 −0.234 −0.213
(1.80) (2.39) (2.61) (1.40)
Constant −3.637 −3.571 −3.546 −3.190
(21.29) (13.60) (24.74) (15.76)




Number of observations (minutes) 154980 198180
†The footnote for Table 2 applies here also.
extra input in the absence of sufficient talent. If this is the reason for differential yellow card
totals for home and away teams, then a visiting team that has similar prospects of victory to
those of a typical home team should not face a different expected number of yellow cards from
that typical home team. So long as we control for win probabilities in the equations for team
yellow cards, the inclusion of a dummy variable to indicate which team is at home should not
add significant explanatory power to themodel. If the coefficient on the home teamdummywere
significant, this would be evidence that there is differential incidence of sanctions incurred by
home and away teams that could not be explained away by the correlation between home–away
status and the teams’ prospects of winning.
Refereeing Bias in Soccer 447
In Tables 4–6, the variable home underdog match distinguishes matches where the underdog
is the team playing at home and the favourite is the team playing away. We estimate bivari-
ate probit models of the probability of receiving a yellow card, straight red card and any red
card (including second yellow). In Table 4, the coefficient estimate on home underdog match is
negative and statistically significant in the underdog equation for yellow cards for each league.
Hence, controlling for the size of the difference in win probabilities as well as for within-game
factors, underdog teams are less likely to receive yellow cards when playing at home rather than
away. Similarly, for the Premier League, the chance of receiving a yellow card is higher for the
favourite playing away rather than at home. However, for the Bundesliga this effect is small and
negative but not significantly different from 0. Therefore, this pattern of results clearly supports
the finding in Dawson et al. (2007) that the tendency of away teams to receive relatively more
yellow cards cannot be fully explained by the fact that, because of home advantage, they are
more often than not the team that is more likely to win the match.
From the results that are shown in Table 5, we observe a large, positive and highly statistically
significant effect of home underdog match on the probability that the favourite team receives a
red card in each league, i.e. controlling for the degree of favourite status in the odds, match score
and within-game dynamics of yellow and red cards, we find that favourites face a higher proba-
bility of receiving a straight red card when playing away rather than at home. This is consistent
with referees generally exhibiting bias in their treatment of red cards in favour of home teams,
and not just in their behaviour with respect to less severe cautionable offences. This finding is
reinforced by the results that are shown in Table 6 for all red cards, including second yellow
cards and not just straight red cards. In each league, teams that are favourites have a significantly
higher probability of receiving a red card, of either type, when they are playing away. For red
cards that are awarded to underdogs we find that the lower probability when they are playing
at home is statistically significant only for the Bundesliga and that only for red cards including
second yellow cards.
We have, then, found several indications that are consistent with home team bias on the part
of referees in both Germany and England. On their own, these indications are not conclusive
evidence of referee bias since it cannot be ruled out that players also react to the presence of a
crowd, whether friendly or unfriendly. For this latter possibility to account for the pattern of
results in Tables 4–6, it would be necessary for away teams to commit more offences, not only
because they are typically underdogs and often trailing in the match, but also because an oppo-
sition crowd generates from them a response, in terms of more aggressive play and committing
more offences, that is stronger than any increase in intensity of play that is triggered among
home players. This is a possibility and cannot be ruled out as a possible explanation of the results
in Tables 4–6. However, attributing our results to referee bias is more plausible to the extent that
this interpretation is consistent with the results from Tables 2 and 3, which, we argued, could
not plausibly be attributed to player behaviour, and with findings from other types of evidence
that are reported in the literature. For example, added time is typically greater when it suits the
interests of the home team. In this case, the finding can be interpreted only as a referee-induced
effect because added time is at his sole discretion and not something that players determine.
Further, Dohmen’s (2008) analysis of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ referee calls, as adjudged by experts
studying film evidence after the event, also shows a tendency for decisions to be biased towards
home teams. It would therefore not be surprising if similar bias were exercised in the specific
case of the award of red and yellow cards.
Our view is therefore that our findings should be a source of concern to the respective govern-
ing bodies that are responsible for assignment, training and monitoring of referees. However,
it cannot be assumed that neutrality would be socially preferable to any given degree of home
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team bias. If referees indeed exhibit systematic bias towards home teams, then this may help to
reinforce home advantage and to help smaller teams to win more home games. This may in turn
raise competitive balance which is alleged by many sports economists to raise audience interest
in the competition. Assuming that reluctance to issue cautions to home teams has a bearing on
the outcome of matches, then small home teams are more likely to win games than they would
otherwise.
4. Conclusions
We have presented a novel disaggregated analysis of potential bias and favouritism displayed by
soccer referees, in which the unit of observation is the minute of play in a match. This disaggre-
gated approach allows us to control for within-game factors of fluctuating scores and dynamics
of the award of cards in a match. With these additional controls in place, inferences on referee
bias are more robust and more compelling than those derived from analyses that use the match
as the unit of observation.
We have two primary exhibits for referee bias in favour of home teams in the award of yellow
and red cards.
(a) From the Bundesliga we find evidence that is consistent with referees being influenced by
home support: home teams playing in stadia without running tracks, and therefore with
the crowd close to the action, have lower probabilities of receiving yellow and red cards
than home teams playing in grounds with running tracks. This is observed even though
a priori we might suspect that allowing the crowd closer to the pitch would raise home
players’ level of aggression rather than lower it. It is therefore indicative of a successful
influence of fans’ ‘social pressure’ on referees, as proposed by Dohmen (2008). The fact
that three teams switched stadium design with removal of a track in our sample period
suggests that this is more than just a specific team effect.
(b) When matches in our two sample leagues are respecified as favourite versus underdog,
rather than home versus away, we obtain evidence, via significant coefficients on the home
underdogmatch dummyvariable, that is consistentwith biased treatment of teams in both
the Premier League and the Bundesliga, in the award of both yellow and red cards.
Clearly, it would be desirable to assess whether our results are supported by analysis from
other European football leagues, and other sports leagues where sanction design and refereeing
technology may differ. Most importantly, further research is needed to assess the implications
of referee bias for league design and corporate governance of sports leagues. Is the bias that
we have detected harmful to stakeholders in the sport? Are audiences both at the stadium and
in front of television sets deterred both by increased sanctions applied by referees and referee
bias in these sanctions? And what exactly are the effects of measures to reduce referee bias on
the uncertainty of outcome of a match and competitive balance in football leagues? These are
deeper research questions that demand attention. For now, our findings, which are strongly
suggestive of favouritism of referees towards home teams, are an essential precursor for these
investigations.
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